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EVIDENCE FROM PUBLICLY - TRADED BANKS IN ASIA
Wahyoe Soedarmono1
This paper examines the relationship between bank capital inflows and financial stability. Using a
sample of publicly-traded commercial banks in Asia over the 2002-2008 period, our empirical results
show that higher banking inflows measured by the share of foreign liabilities in banking reduces systematic
risk, but increases bank-specific risk and total risk. A deeper investigation further suggests that an increase
in total risk and bank-specific risk is driven by strong institutional development. Specifically, higher foreign
liabilities in banking exacerbate bank-specific risk and total risk in countries with greater economic freedom.
Hence, the reinforcement of prudential regulations is necessary to overcome bank-specific risk and total
risk, particularly when the countries move to a more liberal economic environment.
1 The author is a PhD candidate in Money, Banking and Finance at the University of Limoges, France. The views expressed in this paper
is the author»s and do not reflect those of the author»s affiliation. The author can be contacted through the following email:
wahyoe.soedarmono@unilim.fr  or  wsoedarm@yahoo.com
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a large number of studies examining the impact of foreign participation on bank
risk, the current wave of financial globalization and crises again highlight the increasing needs
for better understanding how foreign participation affects financial stability through channels
other than banking ownership or penetration per se. For instance, foreign participation in
banking can be through the presence of foreign managers, foreign debts, or even foreign
customers that demand services from domestic banking institutions.
This paper is the first to analyze the link between foreign participation and bank stability
in the Asian context through financial globalization channel by which foreign counterparts can
play their role in influencing banks» behavior. In this context, we focus on the role of banks»
foreign liabilities, where higher foreign liabilities in banking mean that foreign counterparts
have higher incentives to monitor banks» behavior. Higher foreign liabilities can also be associated
with higher technological innovation and better risk management in banking, so that banks
are able to access financing from international market beforehand. However, higher foreign
liabilities may induce banks to become prone to exchange rate depreciation as observed in the
1997 Asian crisis.
As the wave of financial globalization in Asian banks emerges over the last decades,
foreign participation in banking can also come from foreign debts. Sahminan (2007) works on
the Indonesian banking industry and shows that banks with higher ratio of foreign currency
assets to foreign liabilities are less exposed to exchange rate depreciation which in turn reduces
banks» insolvency risk. Our paper is close to Sahminan (2007) who examines the impact of
exchange rate depreciation on bank stability, but we focus on the role of foreign liabilities in
banking regardless of the exchange rate depreciation aspects. More specifically, our contribution
is threefold.
First, we work on a cross-country setting and focus on the post-1997 Asian crisis period,
while Sahminan (2007) focuses on the Indonesian banking industry in the pre-1997 Asian crisis
period. Second, it is admitted that banks» activities are now increasingly linked to financial
market and thus, contemporary banking crises are due to risks related to financial market
activities. In this regard, the present paper considers various risk measures based financial market
data instead of focusing on banks» balance-sheet indicators. Third, this paper augments the
analysis by examining the role of institutional development. Institutional development has indeed
become an important dimension in attracting foreign participation through the reinforcement
of shareholders» protection and the level of international playing field2. In the Asian context,
institutional development also played a critical role during the 1997 Asian crisis, where Furman
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and Stiglitz (1998) point out that liberalized countries with weak institutional quality are the
ones hardest hit by the 1997 Asian crisis.
In order to investigate the issues raised in this paper, we work on a sample of publicly-
traded banks in seven Asian countries during the 2002-2008 period3. We choose Asian countries
whose data on banking globalization is available, and that are likely to acquire a particular
attention because of their capacity in attracting foreign capital during the last decade, as well
as their openness in permitting foreign participation in banking. These include India, Indonesia,
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 presents the theory,section 3 describes hypotheses and econometric
methodology. Section 4 discusses empirical findings and presents some robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes and highlights policy implications.
II. THEORY
Regarding the link between foreign participation and bank stability, the first strand of
literature focuses on the direct link with foreign entry or foreign ownership. From a broad
sample of emerging economies, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detregiache (1998) find that the presence
of foreign banks reduces the likelihood of banking crisis. In a similar vein, Detregiache and
Gupta (2004) document that the presence of foreign banks has a stabilizing effect before and
during financial crisis. Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) further suggest a positive relationship
between foreign bank entry and bank stability in Latin America. In the emergent economies of
Central and Eastern Europe, Dinger (2009) finds that the presence of foreign banks reduces the
risk of aggregate liquidity shortages. Foreign banks are also shown to have better position than
domestic banks without foreign participation, since foreign banks can provide modern banking
activities with better technological innovation and risk management, as well as access to
international financial markets (Berger et al., 2001; Bonin et al., 2005). On the contrary, some
have argued that domestic banks are better than foreign banks because domestic banks are
unlikely to suffer from a home-bias risk that exacerbates agency problems due to cultural
differences and regulatory environments (Berger et al., 2001; Lensink and Naaborg, 2007).
2 Institutional development also affects the link between financial development and economic growth, so that financial sector does
not always boost economic growth. Specifically, threshold effects in the finance-growth nexus are likely to exist in developing
countries, which in most cases, lack of institutional development (Augier and Soedarmono, 2011).
3 The reason why we focus on the Asian banking industry is that Asian banking has experienced substantial changes in terms of
foreign participation, particularly after the 1997 Asian crisis period. This includes a rapid growth of foreign ownership in banking
because of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as well as an increase in foreign direct investment entering Asian banks. See
Soedarmono et al. (2011a) for further discussion.
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The second strand of literature is associated with the role of bank competition. Jeon et al.
(2011) highlight from a sample of Asian and Latin American banks during 1997-2008that
higher foreign participation in terms of bank ownership enhances competition in the banking
market through spillover effects from foreign partners to domestic counterparts.However,
empirical results on the implications of foreign participation through the link between bank
competition and financial stability are mixed. Working on a broad set of commercial banks
across developing countries over the 1999-2005 period, Ariss (2010) finds that the higher bank
market power, the lower risk and the higher profit efficiency of banks, although higher market
power deteriorates cost efficiency. On the other hand, Soedarmono et al (2011a) focus on the
Asian banking industry and find that banks in less competitive market tend to have higher
insolvency risk due to moral hazard effects.
This paper employs a set of dependent variables to assess financial stability. Specifically,
we use three types of risk measure coming from financial market data. These include total risk
(TRISK), systematic risk (BETA) and idiosyncratic risk or bank-specific risk (SRISK). To calculate
these risk measures, we initially construct the standard market model as follows4.
where ri,j,t is bank i stock return at country j and at day t, while r 
m
j,t is the daily market
returns computed on the basis of domestic market index at country j. In the meantime, ri,j,t and
r mj,t are calculated as follows
   and
where ri,t and rm (j),t  are daily banks» stock price and total market index, respectively. In
constructing Equation (1), we impose a criterion to deal with low bank trading volume.
Specifically, we eliminate banks whose trading days are less than 70% of the total number of
trading days. For each year during the 2002-2008 period, moreover, Equation (1) is estimated
by applying the Panel Least Squares method. Hence, we obtain Equation (1) for each bank i
year by year.
TRISK is the annual standard deviation of daily bank stock returns during the 2002-2008
period, where the measure of daily bank stock returns is expressed by ri,j,t. BETA is the annual
 (1)
 (2)
4 The model specification follows Bautista et al (2009).
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systematic risk or the beta, β, coefficient in Equation (1). Systematic risk is a risk linked to
financial market activities and thus, is often referred to as market risk or non-diversifiable risk.
SRISK is the annual bank-specific risk or idiosyncratic risk which is diversifiable through several
risk managements at the bank level. SRISK is represented by the annual residual terms of the
standard market model, ε, as presented in Equation (1).
Variable of interest in this study is the level of globalization in banking activities and the
degree of economic freedom. We use country-specific data from the International Investment
Position section of the International Financial Statistics as a proxy of banking globalization.
Specifically, we use the share of international liabilities in banking sector over total international
liabilities (BLIAB). Greater BLIAB is associated with higher foreign participation in banking activities
and thus, representing greater financial globalization in banking. In parallel, the degree of
economic freedom is assessed by the Economic Freedom index (FREEDOM) coming from Heritage
Foundation. FREEDOM is a composite index of 10 indicators ranking policies in the areas of
trade, government finances, government interventions, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and black market
activity. The index scores from 0 to 1 with higher scores indicating policies being more conducive
to competition and economic openness.
Several control variables are also included in this study. First, we include the ratio of total
loans to total assets (LOAN) to account for bank opacity. Greater LOAN is likely to exacerbate
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers, while LOAN is the major source of
bank risk. Furthermore, we incorporate the ratio of total deposits to total assets (DEPO), as
bank deposits are also the major source of risk, particularly when market discipline is weak. We
also incorporate the ratio of loan loss reserves to total gross loans (LLR) as a proxy of credit risk,
where higher LLR is expected to increase total risk, systematic risk or bank-specific risk (Agusman
et al, 2008). Following Agusmanet. al. (2008) as well, we incorporate the ratio of equity to
total assets (EQTA) and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (LIQUIDITY) to account for
leverage risk andliquidity risk, respectively. Higher EQTA and LIQUIDITY are expected to enhance
financial stability.
III. METHODOLOGY
There are two hypotheses tested in this paper. First, we aim to test if there is a relationship
between globalization in banking and financial stability as measured by total risk, systematic
risk and idiosyncratic risk. Second, we examine whether or not institutional development affects
the impact of banking globalization on financial stability. Let i,  j, and  t be bank index, country
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index, and time index, respectively, then both steps are respectively presented in the following
equations.
RISK consists of TRISK, BETA and SRISK, while Control represents a set of control variables.
Initially, we calculate risk indicators coming from financial market data. We then run the
regressions of banking globalization on these indicators. Moreover, we also investigate the
impact of the interaction term between banking globalization and institutional development
on financial stability. To estimate such relationships, we use the Fixed Effect regressions with
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
In the present paper, we use bank-specific and country-specific data. For bank-specific
data, we retrieve banks» financial indicators from BankScope Fitch IBCA over the 2002-2008
period. Our initial sample consists of 189 publicly-traded commercial banks in seven Asian
countries. These include India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and
Thailand. In the meantime, we retrieve banking globalization data as country-specific indicator
from International Financial Statistics provided by the IMF. Other country-specific indicator such
Table 1.
Descriptive statistics
TRISK 0.024158 0.022083 0.135767 0.00037 0.01215 1181
BETA 0.832851 0.876176 1.967998 -0.28694 0.403701 1181
SRISK 0.020088 0.01783 0.134859 0.000369 0.011475 1181
BLIAB 0.191862 0.182324 0.396951 0.021616 0.111458 1323
LOAN 0.58088 0.600438 0.886473 0.032652 0.1294 1219
DEPO 0.867947 0.889310 0.970079 0.073737 0.096575 1225
LLR 0.034881 0.02017 0.80149 5.00E-05 0.05337 1135
EQTA 0.068095 0.05796 0.57868 0.00009 5.089816 1226
LIQUIDITY 0.042605 0.001 0.57 0.0001 0.101373 916
FREEDOM 0.629607 0.637 0.90 0.512 0.094772 1820
Variables  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum Std.Dev. Obs.
Source : Author»s calculation
Note : TRISK is the indicator of total risk measured by the annual standard deviation of daily bank stock returns. BETA is the annual
beta coefficient from the standard market model, in which BETA represents market risk or systematic risk. SRISK is bank-specific risk
measured by the annual residual term of the standard market model. BLIAB is the aggregate share of foreign liabilities in banking over
total foreign liabilities. LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total assets. DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. LLR is the ratio
of loan loss reserves to total gross loan. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total
assets. FREEDOM is the Economic Freedom index retrieved from Heritage Foundation.
(3)
(4)
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as institutional development comes from Heritage Foundation, where we assess institutional
development by using the Economic Freedom index. In order to assess financial stability based
on financial market data, we retrieve daily bank stock prices and daily total market index during
2002-2008 from Thomson Datastream International.
Before we run regressions, we impose restrictions to our dataset to deal with outliers and
missing values. We exclude all values that are less than zero for LLR, EQTA and LIQUIDITY. In
Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics of all clean variables used in this study.
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Empirical results
Table 2 shows the relationship between foreign liabilities in banking (BLIAB) and total risk
(TRISK). It can be seen that higher foreign liabilities in banking tend to exacerbate total risk.
Table 2.
The relationship between banking globalization, economic freedom and total
BLIAB 0.0129*** 0.0131*** 0.0135*** 0.0101*** 0.0081** 0.0143*** -0.3622***
(2.083) (2.152) (2.215) (2.606) (2.142) (3.499) (-4.369)
LOAN -0.0275*** -0.0258*** -0.0195 -0.0194 -0.0212 -0.0321***
(-5.048) (-4.643) (-1.443) (-1.451) (-1.242) (-4.421)
DEPO -0.0125* 0.0061 -0.0148 -0.0093 -0.0126
(-1.655) (0.6927) (-1.431) (-0.7805) (-1.179)
LLR 0.0559*** 0.0562*** 0.0541*** 0.0505***
(3.901) (4.504) (4.316) (5.147)
EQTA -0.0627*** -0.0667*** -0.0698***
(-2.909) (-2.738) (-3.735)
LIQUIDITY 0.0161 0.0172**
(1.565) (2.464)
FREEDOM -0.0354
(-1.079)
BLIAB*FREEDOM 0.5964***
(4.944)
Obsevation 1181 1118 1118 1043 1043 859 859
Adj R-square 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.51
Explanatory
Var.
Source: Author»s calculation.
Note: Dependent variable is TRISK which represents the indicator of total risk and measured by the annual standard deviation of daily
bank stock returns. BLIAB is the aggregate share of foreign liabilities in banking over total foreign liabilities. LOAN is the ratio of total
loans to total assets. DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. LLR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total gross loan. EQTA
is the ratio of total equity to total assets. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. FREEDOM is the Economic Freedom
index retrieved from Heritage Foundation. Estimations are carried out using the Panel Fixed Effect regressions by considering White»s
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Constants are included but not reported. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Var. : TRISK
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
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This finding is robust to various control variable modifications as presented in Model 1 to
Model 6. Moreover, we examine how the interaction term between institutional development
and foreign liabilities in banking affects total risk, as shown in Model 7. It shows that the
positive impact of banks» foreign liabilities on total risk is dependent on institutional development.
More precisely, only in countries with higher economic freedom, the positive relationship between
banking globalization and total risk holds. This further suggests that in countries with lower
economic freedom, higher foreign liabilities in banking reduce total risk.
Meanwhile, Table 3 presents the impact of banks» foreign liabilities (BLIAB) on systematic
risk (BETA). By estimating different model specifications as presented in Model 1 to Model 6, it
shows that banks» foreign liabilities have a stabilizing effect in terms of reducing systematic
risk. But, the link between banks» foreign liabilities and systematic risk is no longer significant
when we take into account the role of institutional development as shown in Model 7. Economic
freedom does not seem to influence the relationship between bank globalization and systematic
risk.
Table 3.
The relationship between banking globalization, economic freedom and systematic risk
BLIAB -1.984*** -2.032*** -2.041*** -2.129*** -2.163*** -2.161*** -3.105
(-11.689) (-11.924) (-11.972) (-12.319) (-12.493) (-11.786) (-1.335)
LOAN -0.6573*** -0.6977*** -0.5690*** -0.5684*** -0.4779** -0.4672**
(-4.303) (-4.485) (-3.161) (-3.164) (-2.381) (-2.297)
DEPO 0.2874 0.1649 -0.1927 -0.2190 -0.2168
(1.361) (0.6918) (-0.6684) (-0.7301) (-0.7216)
LLR -0.2086 -0.2051 -0.1372 -0.0799
(-0.7807) (-0.7693) (-0.515) (-0.2903)
EQTA -1.073** -1.109** -1.153**
(-2.197) (-2.134) (-2.198)
LIQUIDITY -0.1841 -0.1932
(-0.9408) (-0.9849)
FREEDOM -0.6407
(-0.6964)
BLIAB*FREEDOM 1.245
(0.3679)
Obsevation 1181 1118 1118 1043 1043 859 859
Adj R-square 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.64
Explanatory
Var.
Source: Author»s calculation.
Note: Dependent variable is BETA which represents the indicator of systematic risk and measured by the annual beta coefficient of
the standard market model. BLIAB is the aggregate share of foreign liabilities in banking over total foreign liabilities. LOAN is the ratio
of total loans to total assets. DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. LLR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total gross loan.
EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. FREEDOM is the Economic
Freedom index retrieved from Heritage Foundation. Estimations are carried out using the Panel Fixed Effect regressions by considering
White»s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Constants are included but not reported. ***,**,* indicate significant at the
1%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Var. : BETA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
135Bank Capital Inflows, Institutional Development and Risk: Evidence from Publicly - Traded Banks in Asia
In terms of the link between banks» foreign liabilities (BLIAB) and bank-specific risk (SRISK),
Table 4 presents our empirical findings for a number of model specifications. Higher foreign
liabilities in banking increase idiosyncratic risk, but again this relationship is dependent on
economic freedom. Only in countries with greater economic freedom, higher foreign liabilities
in banking worsen bank-specific risk. This may be due to the fact that under higher economic
freedom, foreign liabilities held by banks may be excessive, as banks are free to raise funding
from international market. Hence, the countries with greater economic freedom can be more
exposed to exchange rate depreciation that in turn exacerbates bank-specific risk.
Table 4. The relationship between banking globalization,
economic freedom and idiosyncratic risk (bank-specific risk)
BLIAB 0.0221*** 0.0212*** 0.0216*** 0.0174*** 0.0157*** 0.0201*** -0.1618**
(3.969) (3.945) (4.019) (3.204) (2.896) (3.228) (-2.098)
LOAN -0.0362*** -0.0344*** -0.0295*** -0.0294*** -0.0331*** -0.0386***
(-7.515) (-7.027) (-5.197) (-5.227) (-4.876) (-5.719)
DEPO -0.0125 0.0054 -0.0128 -0.0082 -0.0099
(-1.885) (0.7135) (-1.416) (-0.810) (-0.9901)
LLR 0.0546*** 0.0548*** 0.0524*** 0.0503***
(6.489) (6.555) (5.817) (5.519)
EQTA -0.0545*** -0.0589*** -0.0602***
(-3.558) (-3.347) (-3.462)
LIQUIDITY 0.0131** 0.0136**
(1.969) (2.099)
FREEDOM -0.0141
(-0.4608)
BLIAB*FREEDOM 0.2894**
(2.579)
Obsevation 1181 1118 1118 1043 1043 859 859
Adj R-square 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.53
Explanatory
Var.
Source: Author»s calculation.
Note: Dependent variable is SRISK which represents the indicator of idiosyncratic risk and measured by the annual residual term of the
standard market model. BLIAB is the aggregate share of foreign liabilities in banking over total foreign liabilities. LOAN is the ratio of
total loans to total assets. DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. LLR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total gross loan.
EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. FREEDOM is the Economic
Freedom index retrieved from Heritage Foundation. Estimations are carried out using the Panel Fixed Effect regressions by considering
White»s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Constants are included but not reported. ***,**,* indicate significant at the
1%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Var. : SRISK
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
This finding is somehow consistent to Sahminan (2007), where there is a positive
relationship between exchange rate depreciation and insolvency risk for banks with higher
share of foreign liabilities. To the extent that only idiosyncratic risk plays a significant role in
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capturing bank instability in Asia (Agusman et al, 2008), our findings are also consistent with
Agusman et al (2008). Specifically, systematic risk in the present paper is not an important
source of instability due to higher banks» foreign liabilities, regardless of the level of countries»
institutional development. Overall, the empirical findings suggest that investors in countries
with higher economic freedom are more concerned with total risk and bank-specific risk in this
regard.
With regards to control variables, higher banks» loan portfolio (LOAN) is associated with
lower total risk, lower systematic risk and lower bank-specific risk. This suggests that bank
lending activities are not source of instability. This result contradicts with the nature of bank
loan portfolio which is opaque. Presumably, Asian banks suffer from a managerial self-interest
problem in which managers in banks with higher asymmetric information might be driving
banks to become safer by holding less risky loan portfolios (Bris and Cantale, 2004; Soedarmono
et al, 2011b). Bank deposits (DEPO) also does not seem to be the source of instability. In line
with Agusman et al (2008), higher loan loss reserves ratio (LLR) is associated with higher total
risk and bank-specific risk. Meanwhile, the link between bank capitalization (EQTA) and RISK
fulfills our expected sign. Higher bank capital ratio reduces total risk, systematic risk and bank-
specific risk.
4.2. Robustness checks
In order to further ensure for robustness linked to variable omission issues, we also perform
some sensitivity analyses5. First, it is shown that Model 6 and 7 from Table 2, 3 and 4 suffer
from observation loss when we incorporate LIQUDITY as control variable. To ensure that the
empirical results obtained are not due to observation bias, we exclude LIQUIDITY and re-estimate
Model 6 and 7 in all three cases. However, this consideration does not change our empirical
results discussed in Section 4.1. Second, due to the fact that our bank sample comes from
countries with different level of macroeconomic environment, we also consider the influence
of economic development and inflation rate to account for this dimension. In other words, we
include the real gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation rate (INF) as control variable. On the
whole, our empirical results are not altered with regards to the link between banking
globalization, economic freedom and financial stability as measured by total risk, systematic
risk and idiosyncratic risk.
5 The results are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis, financial globalization in Asian banking in the
form of FDI and foreign ownership, as well as a rapid growth of foreign capital inflows entering
Asian countries due to the 2008 credit crisis and the 2010 European debt crisis, urgently require
better understanding whether or not greater foreign participations enhance financial stability.
Nowadays, such an increasing trend of foreign participations also show that Asian countries
are already in a better position in terms of institutional development, so that they have been
successful in attracting foreign participations. However, there is no attempt to investigate the
impact of foreign participations and institutional development on financial stability in the Asian
context.
This paper attempts to fulfill such a gap by assessing the impact of foreign participation
on financial stability through channel other than foreign participation commonly used in the
previous literature, such as bank foreign ownership, foreign bank entry, or bank competition.
In the present paper, we consider the indicator of foreign participation measured by the aggregate
share of foreign liabilities in banking over total foreign liabilities. Using a sample of publicly-
traded commercial banks in seven Asian countries during 2002-2008, the empirical results
from the Fixed Effect regressions show that higher foreign liabilities in banking reduces systematic
risk, but exacerbates bank-specific risk and total risk. However, we further shows that such
findings only hold for countries with greater economic freedom, suggesting the needs for
enhancing prudential regulations when banking in a more liberal environment are more
globalized in terms of their abilities to raise financing from international financial market. To
this end, bank-specific risk and total risk can be reduced, bank failure can be prevented, and
the systemic risk of bank failure can be avoided.
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